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Global Compact on Migration December 2018 – can a people-ceŶtred approach solve the ͚ŵigraŶt 
crisis? Sheona York, Kent Law Clinic, University of Kent  
Abstract 
On 11 December 2018 a UN ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐe Đeleďƌated the adoptioŶ of the ͞Fiƌst-Ever Global Compact 
foƌ safe, oƌdeƌlǇ aŶd ƌegulaƌ ŵigƌatioŶ͟. This CoŵpaĐt͛s stƌategiĐ iŶteŶtioŶ is to ĐoŶfiŶe gloďal 
migration to regulated and controlled flows. 
IŶ this CoŵpaĐt, the ŵajoƌitǇ of the ǁoƌld͛s nation states have put their names to what amounts to a 
detailed description of what social, political, cultural and legal life should be like, in every part of the 
ǁoƌld, alďeit seeŶ thƌough the pƌisŵ of ͞ŵigƌatioŶ as a gloďal pƌoďleŵ͟. “ustaiŶaďilitǇ policies are 
diƌeĐted to assist ͚seŶdiŶg͛ ĐouŶtƌies deǀelop ͚ƌesilieŶĐe stƌategies͛ to pƌoteĐt agaiŶst sloǁ aŶd fast-
acting disasters, and provide economic, social, health and educational programmes sufficient to 
ensure that their nationals are not impelled to emigrate in order to seek a better life. Countries both 
of ͚tƌaŶsit͛ aŶd ͚destiŶatioŶ͛ aƌe eŶĐouƌaged to pƌoǀide aĐĐoŵŵodatioŶ, suďsisteŶĐe, health Đaƌe, 
educational and work opportunities for migrants, as well as reducing bureaucratic barriers to 
applǇiŶg foƌ ǀisas. ͚DestiŶatioŶ͛ ĐouŶtƌies aƌe eŶĐouƌaged to faĐilitate faŵilǇ ƌeuŶioŶ foƌ teŵpoƌaƌǇ 
migrants, reduce precariousness, and encourage integration.  
 
What is being proposed here is effectively the most highly-regulated and public-spirited 
management of the global capitalist system to provide a healthy, safe and fulfilling life for everyone, 
though here with the spotlight on migrants. Yet there is no mention at all of politics, economics, 
religion, or culture, (and only a bare whisper of a reference to climate change) and therefore no 
recognition or assessment of the different, ideas, beliefs, forces and processes at work in the world 
which drive migration. 
 
Drawing on my own casework for asylum-seekeƌ ĐlieŶts fƌoŵ oŶe ͚seŶdiŶg͛ ĐouŶtƌǇ ;EƌitƌeaͿ aŶd one 
͚tƌaŶsit ĐouŶtƌǇ͛ ;ItalǇͿ aŶd foƌ asǇluŵ aŶd faŵilǇ ŵigƌaŶts iŶ oŶe ͚destiŶatioŶ ĐouŶtƌǇ͛ ;the UKͿ, I 
eǆaŵiŶe ǁhetheƌ the CoŵpaĐt͛s appliĐatioŶ of a people-centred approach to all migrants can 
transcend the forces of global capitalism. 
 
1. Introduction 
OŶ ϭϭ DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϴ a UN ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐe Đeleďƌated the adoptioŶ of the ͞Fiƌst-Ever Global Compact 
foƌ safe, oƌdeƌlǇ aŶd ƌegulaƌ ŵigƌatioŶ͟. This CoŵpaĐt͛s stƌategiĐ iŶteŶtioŶ is to ĐoŶfiŶe gloďal 
migration to regulated and controlled flows. 
Most of the ǁoƌld͛s nation states have put their names to what amounts to a detailed description of 
what social, political, cultural and legal life should be like, in every part of the world, albeit seen 
thƌough the pƌisŵ of ͞ŵigƌatioŶ as a gloďal pƌoďleŵ͟. CouŶtƌies of eŵigration are encouraged to 
provide programmes to lessen the need to emigrate in order to seek a better life. These include such 
diverse policies as the education of women and the regulation of remittances to reduce their cost 
and ensure their spending is direĐted to iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶts iŶ the ƌeĐipieŶts͛ soĐieties. These ͚seŶdiŶg͛ 
countries are encouraged to defend against both fast-acting and slow-acting disasters, to reduce 
numbers obliged to flee from climate-based or natural catastrophes. Countries of both transit and 
destination are encouraged to provide accommodation, subsistence, health care, education and 
work opportunities for migrants, as well as generally contributing to unification and digitalisation of 
documentation and reducing bureaucratic barriers to applying for visas. Destination countries are 
encouraged in addition to facilitate family reunion for temporary migrants and reduce the incidence 
of precariousness, and to encourage integration.  
  
 
Three points stand out.  
First, unlike, for example, the UN Refugee Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (the 3 main conventions concerning migrants 
ǁhiĐh haǀe legal foƌĐe oŶĐe ƌatified ďǇ sigŶatoƌǇ statesͿ, ͞… the Compact is not legally binding. Its 
guidiŶg pƌiŶĐiples ƌeaffiƌŵ “tates͛ soǀeƌeigŶ ƌights to deteƌŵiŶe theiƌ ŶatioŶal ŵigƌatioŶ poliĐies aŶd 
to govern migration within their jurisdictions.͟ [pƌess ƌelease ϭϭ/ϭϮ/ϭϴ]. 
Secondly, the large number of generally laudable objectives, each supported by richly-elaborated 
programmes, are to be worked on flexibly: ͞As migration experiences and challenges vary across the 
world, the Global Compact is a flexible instrument that can meet the needs of every country and 
stimulate joint cooperation at all levels.͟ Press release 11/12/18] 
 
But thirdly and most important is the colossal ambition presupposed by the Compact. It must be the 
fiƌst tiŵe iŶ ǁhiĐh the ŵajoƌitǇ if Ŷot all the ǁoƌld͛s ŶatioŶ states haǀe put theiƌ Ŷaŵes to a highlǇ-
regulated and public-spirited management of the global capitalist system to provide a healthy, safe 
aŶd fulfilliŶg life foƌ eǀeƌǇoŶe, iŶ eǀeƌǇ paƌt of the ǁoƌld, alďeit seeŶ thƌough the pƌisŵ of ͞ŵigƌatioŶ 
as a gloďal pƌoďleŵ͟. But feǁ eǀeŶ fiƌst-world countries aspire to, never mind succeed in, providing 
such high standards, whether of accommodation, subsistence, health care and education or of legal 
rights, even to their existing populations. Neither is there any mention of politics, economics, 
religion, or culture, (and only a bare whisper of a reference to climate change) and therefore no 
recognition or assessment of the different forces and processes at work in the world which drive 
migration. Whereas in reality migration, viewed globally, is an outcome of the effects of capitalist 
forces seeking to overcome barriers to profitable activity. It is a response of millions of separate 
individuals and families to the impact of those effects whether directly economic (as in loss of jobs 
or land) or indirectly as a result of geopolitical conflicts or political repression driven by economic 
foƌĐes. CouŶtƌies, ǁhetheƌ ͚seŶdiŶg͛, ͚tƌaŶsit͛ oƌ ͚ƌeĐeiǀiŶg͛, haǀe goǀeƌŶŵeŶts, ǁhiĐh ƌepƌeseŶt 
economic, political and religious forces in those societies, whose relative strengths change over time. 
At the time of writing, events in Venezuela and Brazil1 show how, in a short time, countries can tip 
over from enjoying growing economies, popular governments and hopeful citizens into tangles of 
political tension, economic chaos and geopolitical interventions, driving the sudden emigration of 
millions as just one among many individual coping mechanisms. 
 
I have acted for asylum-seekers from all over the world, who arrived using widely differing migration 
routes. I have been acting for Eritreans since ďefoƌe that ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe, heaƌiŶg ϯϬ Ǉeaƌs 
of political critiques and disappointment at the newly independent regime, and fear of being 
persecuted by it. Eƌitƌea ͚seŶds͛ ƌefugees at a ƌate of ϱ,ϬϬϬ ǇouŶg people peƌ ŵoŶth eǀadiŶg 
compulsory military service. The majority languish in refugee camps in Ethiopia and Sudan, some 
struggle to survive in detention camps in Libya and, of the few who reach European countries, most 
aƌe foƌŵallǇ ƌeĐogŶised as ƌefugees. I aƌgue that Eƌitƌea͛s ƌole oŶ the ǁoƌld stage as a friendless, 
saŶĐtioŶed aŶd iŵpoǀeƌished ͚seŶdiŶg ĐouŶtƌǇ͛ ĐaŶ oŶlǇ ďe uŶdeƌstood ďǇ laǇiŶg ďaƌe its ĐoloŶial 
                                                          
1 Venezuela is currently in the news as the US and some EU countries have formally recognised the opposition leader as 
president. Perry Anderson succinctly describes Brazil’s situation in Bolsonaro’s Brazil, London Review of Books 7 February 
2019.  
  
history and uncovering the reasons for its current lonely position in African and Middle Eastern 
geopolitics.  
 
In 2009 the case of M.S.S v Belgium and Greece2 deteƌŵiŶed that Belgiuŵ ͚kŶeǁ oƌ ought to haǀe 
kŶoǁŶ͛ that ĐoŶditioŶs iŶ GƌeeĐe foƌ asǇluŵ-seekers could potentially breach art 3 ECHR, so 
pƌohiďitiŶg the appliĐaŶt͛s ƌetuƌŶ theƌe uŶdeƌ the DuďliŶ ‘egulatioŶ, the EU͛s ďuƌdeŶ-sharing 
system. In 2011 the CJEU decided in NS v UK, also concerning sending an asylum-seeker back to 
Greece,3 that a Meŵďeƌ “tate͛s deĐisioŶ Ŷot to eŶfoƌĐe a ͚DuďliŶ͛ ƌetuƌŶ ǁas aŶ aĐt Đoǀeƌed ďǇ EU 
law and thus also by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In 2009 I had taken the first of many 
cases in which asylum-seekers wished to resist a Dublin return to Italy,4 because conditions for 
asylum-seekers there, although not as bad as in Greece, would probably breach art 3 ECHR. In the 
EU CoŵŵoŶ AsǇluŵ PoliĐǇ ItalǇ is tƌeated as a ͚destiŶatioŶ ĐouŶtƌǇ͛ ;aŶd is so defiŶed iŶ UK laǁͿ.5 
But because, on the evidence, it fails to provide adequate reception conditions for asylum-seekers, 
and also fails to provide sufficient employment or accommodation whether for those granted 
refugee status oƌ its oǁŶ ĐitizeŶs, ItalǇ is ƌeduĐed to ďeiŶg a ͚tƌaŶsit ĐouŶtƌǇ͛. I aƌgue that, ǁithout 
analysing its current weak economy and fragmented politics in the light of its economic and political 
history since the establishment of the Italian unified state in 1ϴϲϭ, aŶǇ atteŵpt fƌoŵ ͚outside͛ to 
apply the aspirations of the Global Compact to Italy would fail. 
 
The UK is a tƌue ͚destiŶatioŶ ĐouŶtƌǇ͛. Not ǀiƌtuallǇ ďuilt ďǇ iŵŵigƌaŶts like the U“A oƌ Austƌalia, ďut, 
like the Netherlands and France, a previous country of empire with a long history of strong eco-
nomic, political and social links with its ex-colonies. But the UK has been until recently a significant 
͚seŶdiŶg ĐouŶtƌǇ͛ itself, to those ĐoloŶies aŶd the ƌest of the ǁoƌld. Not just as ͚ƌuleƌs of Eŵpiƌe͛ ďut 
also iŶ despeƌatioŶ, as ǁith Iƌish people fleeiŶg the ϭϴϰϬ͛s Gƌeat FaŵiŶe,6 Scottish people fleeing the 
Highland Clearances,7 and also forcibly, as convicts transported to Australia.8 And also, since the sec-
ond world war, as economic migrants mainly to the Dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand,9 
Hong Kong and South Africa) and more recently to elsewhere in the European Union. The 2010 Con-
seƌǀatiǀe ŵaŶifesto pƌoŵise to ƌeduĐe ͚Ŷet ŵigƌatioŶ͛ iŵpliĐitlǇ ƌecognises this historical two-way 
flow (though without devoting any policy analysis to what drives the emigration side of the equa-
tion). Over decades, as part of this flow, some millions of people have entered the UK, in search of 
work, to join family, to study or to seek asylum. As at 2017 some 14% of the UK population were 
born abroad.  
 
However the UK has never adopted aspirations like those proposed by the Global Compact.  Both 
Conservative and Labour governments have legislated over decades to restrict entry save to specific 
                                                          
2 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece 30696/09 ECtHR 
3 Joined cases of NS v UK and ME & others v Ireland, C411-10 and C-493/10 
4 EW [2009] EWHC 2957 (Admin) 
5 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 s8, part 2 of Schedule 3 
6 In which, while Ireland was under British rule, 1 million people died and another million emigrated 
7 See for example not just John Prebble’s classic The Highland Clearances Penguin 1963, Eric Richards The Highland 
Clearances Birlinn 2000, and also Donald MacKay Scotland Farewell: the people of the Hector Birlinn 1980, telling of the 
people of Ullapool, Assynt, becoming the first Scots to arrive in what became Nova Scotia 1773 
8 See for example Robert Hughes The Fatal Shore, Vintage Books 2003 
9 Where most of my father’s family went, in the early 1950’s 
  
Đategoƌies of ŵigƌaŶt, aŶd legislated to ƌestƌiĐt ŵigƌaŶts͛ aĐĐess to soĐial housiŶg aŶd soĐial assis-
tance. In relation to asylum-seekeƌs, ƌefeƌƌed to ďǇ ďoth paƌties as ͚sĐƌouŶgeƌs͛ aŶd ͚ďogus͛, ďoth 
parties have restricted access to accommodation and support, and all but prohibited access to work 
aŶd higheƌ eduĐatioŶ, ĐitiŶg the ͚pull faĐtoƌ͛.10 In 2013 Theresa May as Home Secretary announced 
the ͚hostile eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt͛, aiŵed at dƌiǀiŶg out ͚uŶlaǁful ŵigƌaŶts͛ ďut, as shoǁŶ ďǇ the ͚WiŶdƌush͛ 
scandal, heavily affecting lawful migrants as well.11 Moreover, the Coalition and Conservative gov-
eƌŶŵeŶts͛ austeƌitǇ poliĐies siŶĐe the 2008 financial crisis have led to a situation where the Com-
paĐt͛s aiŵs aƌe Ŷot eǀeŶ ŵet foƌ a sigŶifiĐaŶt pƌopoƌtioŶ of the UK͛s oǁŶ ĐitizeŶ aŶd settled popula-
tion. This is dramatically described in the recent UN report on UK poverty by Prof Alston.12  
 
I ĐoŶĐlude that a ͚people-ĐeŶtƌed appƌoaĐh͛ i.e. oŶe Ŷot ďased oŶ the deŵoĐƌatiĐ deĐisioŶs of 
national populations (or of even the undemocratic decisions of authoritarian national governments), 
but on a supra-national elite-pƌoposed ͚pƌogƌaŵŵe͛ ĐeŶtƌed oŶ aŶd pƌioƌitisiŶg the Ŷeeds of 
migrants, is not just merely aspirational (and therefore looks good but unlikely to have any effective 
operational impact). Such an approach both obscures the true reasons for the ills suffered by 
migrants, and, in my view, by singling out people qua migrants, gets in the way of building solidarity 
between citizens and those more recent arrivals (now, instead of being welcomed and integrated, 
aƌe deeŵed ďǇ laǁ iŶ the UK to ďe ͚pƌeĐaƌious͛Ϳ.13 Such proposals fuel populist anti-migrant 
feeling,14 itself stigmatised by elites as racist, xenophobic etc while its causes remain unexamined. I 
argue that adopting a people-centred approach in fact inhibits us from analysing migration as one 
among many outcomes of global capitalist and geopolitical processes, along with neoliberal 
economics, austerity politics, enforced regime change and so on. In my view such an approach 
leaves us blaming the wrong people (repressive regimes in Africa, xenophobes in Europe) rather 
than identifying as causes the crises of capitalism and its geopolitical and national political 
movements and effects as underlying and driving global migration trends. 
 
2. Eritrea - a ͚seŶdiŶg couŶtry͛ 
Eritrea is a small country on the Red Sea with a harsh desert and mountainous climate and a 
population of around 5 ŵillioŶ. The EĐoŶoŵist aŵoŶg otheƌs ƌefeƌs to Eƌitƌea as the ͚Noƌth Koƌea of 
AfƌiĐa͛,15 summing up its history thus: 
Its war of liberation from neighbouring Ethiopia, which began in the 1960s and only ended in 
1991, ǁas oŶe of AfƌiĐa͛s loŶgest-running conflicts. Then, as a newly independent country, it 
                                                          
10 I have written on the history of the UK’s ‘welcome’ to asylum-seekers, and the legal challenges to these measures, in The 
Law of Common Humanity - Revisiting Limbuela in the ‘hostile environment’ JIANL  31/4 2017 
11 I have written on this in The Hostile Environment – how Home Office immigration policies and practices create and 
perpetuate illegality JIANL 32/4 2018 
12UN Statement of Visit to UK Professor Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, 
London 16 November 2018 
13 Rhuppiah [2018] UKSC 58, Richard Warren Private life in the balance: Constructing the precarious migrant JIANL vol 
30/2 2016 
14
 Brussels protest over UN migration pact turns violent Guardian 16/12/2018 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
46585237 accessed 17/3/19 
15 The Economist https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/08/14/why-eritrea-is-called-africas-north-korea 
also Forbes World Affairs https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2018/06/13/is-eritrea-becoming-the-north-korea-of-
africa/  also Haaretz, the New Statesman etc , accessed 20/1/19 
  
fought a ǁaƌ ǁith Ethiopia ďetǁeeŶ ϭϵϵϴ aŶd ϮϬϬϬ, oŶe of the ďloodiest iŶ the ĐoŶtiŶeŶt͛s 
history, which only formally ended on July 8th of this year [2018]. Eritrea was AfƌiĐa͛s laƌgest 
single source of refugees to Europe from 2014 to 2016. Over the past decade so many 
people haǀe left that Eƌitƌea has ďeeŶ Đalled the ǁoƌld͛s fastest-emptying nation. 
Lawyers representing Eritrean asylum-seekers from both before and since independence have heard 
first-haŶd aĐĐouŶts of hoǁ the ǀiĐtoƌious People͛s FƌoŶt foƌ DeŵoĐƌaĐǇ aŶd JustiĐe ;PFDJͿ, theŶ as 
the EƌitƌeaŶ People͛s LiďeƌatioŶ FƌoŶt ;EPLFͿ, fought ƌuthlesslǇ thƌough the ϳϬ͛s aŶd ϴϬ͛s to eliŵiŶate 
political opponents from the liberation struggle, and then, on independence in 1993, established the 
one-party state still in power today. Members of the Eritrean Liberation Front – Revolutionary 
Council16 among other groups, as well as individuals who had previously supported the EPLF, who 
had all hoped for a democratic multi-party government after independence, fled the country during 
the ϵϬ͛s as it ďeĐaŵe Đleaƌ that Ŷo ĐoŶstitutioŶal ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐe ǁould ďe held iŶ ϭϵϵϰ as had ďeeŶ 
promised, and restrictions on free speech and political activity intensified rather than lessened. 
Compulsory military and national service, maintained amongst the freedom fighters after 
independence to aid national reconstruction, and then maintained again after the war with Ethiopia, 
has ďeeŶ ƌuthlesslǇ eŶfoƌĐed eǀeƌ siŶĐe. Theƌe has ďeeŶ a ͚shoot to kill͛ poliĐǇ agaiŶst people illegallǇ 
crossing the border, and faŵilies of ͚dƌaft eǀadeƌs͛ haǀe ďeeŶ fiŶed laƌge suŵs of ŵoŶeǇ aŶd 
themselves imprisoned and tortured for not effecting the return of their teenage children or 
disclosing their whereabouts.17  
The ŵost ƌeĐeŶt UK iŵŵigƌatioŶ tƌiďuŶal ͚ĐouŶtƌǇ guidaŶĐe͛ Đase oŶ EƌitƌeaŶ asǇluŵ Đlaiŵs18 
deĐlaƌed Eƌitƌea͛s ĐoŵpulsoƌǇ ŵilitary service policy to amount to forced labour in breach of art 4 
ECHR, thus virtually guaranteeing refugee status to anyone accepted as being from Eritrea and likely 
to have left illegally. It is that compulsory military service policy which has led to the constant flow of 
refugees as people of younger and younger ages flee over the borders as the round-up age for 
ĐoŵpulsoƌǇ ŵilitaƌǇ seƌǀiĐe has ďeeŶ loǁeƌed. The UK ͚ĐouŶtƌǇ guidaŶĐe͛ aĐĐepts that asǇluŵ-
seeking children as young as 5 years old are likely to have left Eritrea illegally and would be at risk of 
peƌseĐutioŶ oŶ ƌetuƌŶ as ͚dƌaft eǀadeƌs͛ aŶd theƌefoƌe tƌaitoƌs to the ƌegiŵe. 
OŶ ͚seŶdiŶg ĐouŶtƌies͛ the CoŵpaĐt saǇs this: 
OBJECTIVE 2: Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to 
leave their country of origin  
18. We commit to create conducive political, economic, social and environmental conditions 
for people to lead peaceful, productive and sustainable lives in their own country and to fulfil 
their personal aspirations, while ensuring that desperation and deteriorating environments do 
not compel them to seek a livelihood elsewhere through irregular migration. 
 
To do this the CoŵpaĐt ǁill ͚dƌaǁ fƌoŵ the folloǁiŶg aĐtioŶs͛: 
                                                          
16
 See e.g. Home Office Country of origin reports from the 90’s (archived now), and also Michael Weldghiorghis Tedla’s  
thesis cited at fn 22 below 
17 See Human Rights Watch Service for life: State repression and indefinite conscription in Eritrea 16 April 2009, and the 
2015 report Eritrea: National Service by Landinfo, the Norwegian country of origin information service, among the 
extensive academic and NGO reports attached to the various UK Country Guidance tribunal cases cited in MST, cited below. 
18
 MST and Others (national service – risk categories) Eritrea CG [2016] UKUT 443 (IAC) 
  
(b) Invest in programmes that accelerate States’ fulfilment of the Sustainable Development 
Goals with the aim of eliminating the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel 
people to leave their country of origin, including through poverty eradication, food security, 
health and sanitation, education, inclusive economic growth, infrastructure, urban and rural 
development, employment creation, decent work, gender equality and empowerment of 
women and girls, resilience and disaster risk reduction, climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, addressing the socioeconomic effects of all forms of violence, non-discrimination, 
rule of law and good governance, access to justice and protection of human rights, as well as 
creating and maintaining peaceful and inclusive societies with effective, accountable and 
transparent institutions …19 
 
It is unrealistic to expect the current Eritrean government to do any of this. Even the writer Thomas 
Keneally, known (and criticised) for his sympathetic 1989 account of the EPLF,20 has since stated that 
pƌesideŶt Afeǁeƌki should Ǉield up goǀeƌŶŵeŶt to soŵeoŶe ǁho ĐaŶ ͚iŶstitutioŶalise … deŵoĐƌatiĐ 
ǀalues͛.21 But he maintains that Eritrea was and continues to be punished by the West for its 
determination to achieve independence. Effectively he is directing us to look elsewhere for the 
ƌeasoŶs ǁhǇ Eƌitƌea is a ͚seŶdiŶg ĐouŶtƌǇ͛: aŶd it ĐaŶ ďe iŶfeƌƌed fƌoŵ ǁhat he saǇs that the 
CompaĐt͛s ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ of ͚iŶǀestŵeŶt iŶ pƌogƌaŵŵes͛ ǁill Ŷot suffiĐe to aĐhieǀe a ͚peaĐeful 
aŶd iŶĐlusiǀe soĐietǇ.͛ 
The Eritrean background22 
In I didŶ͛t do it foƌ Ǉou23 MiĐhela WƌoŶg pƌoǀides a seaƌiŶg histoƌǇ of Eƌitƌea͛s eŵeƌgeŶĐe fƌoŵ 
colonial oppression. She saǇs: ͚it͛s haƌd to thiŶk of aŶotheƌ AfƌiĐaŶ ĐouŶtƌǇ that ǁas iŶteƌfeƌed ǁith 
ďǇ foƌeigŶ poǁeƌs Ƌuite so thoƌoughlǇ, aŶd so disastƌouslǇ, as Eƌitƌea͛.24   
Eritrea, part of the ancient empire of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), was semi-privately controlled by Italy after 
theǇ oďtaiŶed the poƌts of Assaď aŶd Massaǁa iŶ the ϭϴϳϬ͛s. ItalǇ atteŵpted to ĐoŶƋueƌ the ǁhole 
of Abyssinia, but after defeat at the 1896 Battle of Adua, Italy retained only Eritrea. Martini, an 
Italian elder statesman, enforced the setting up aspects of a modern society – an independent 
judiciary, a telegraph system and departments of finance, health and education, and terminated 
laŶd eǆpƌopƌiatioŶ foƌ ItaliaŶ settleƌs. To eǆploit Eƌitƌea͛s iŶlaŶd ƌesouƌĐes ItalǇ ďuilt the ͚steel sŶake͛ 
– a most impressive railway from Massawa to Asmara, climbing 2,300m in 70 kilometres. Wrong 
argues that this among other economic developments allowed Eritreans to develop some sense of 
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nationality distinct from Ethiopia – a completely unexpected political by-product of colonial 
activity.25  
Tekeste Negash, writing in 1997, 26 argues: 
 
the most important function of the colony remained as a supplier of colonial soldiers for Italian expan-
sion elsewhere. … Under the Italians, Eritrea approached a modern-style economy … Drought virtually 
ceased to be a catastrophic experience, since the colonial government could avert hunger crises through 
food imports There were no armed conflicts among the various ethnic groups… By the end of the 
1930s an entire generation of Eritreans had grown up under the peace established by the Italian colonial 
system.’  
 
Mussolini decided to avenge the battle of Adua. Eritrea, used as a staging-post for the invasion, saw 
further economic modernisation. In 1936 the Italians declared victory over Ethiopia, sending the 
emperor Haile Selassie into exile. However Ethiopia never achieved the level of economic 
development as Eritrea. Meanwhile Mussolini introduced racist laws which Negash argues further 
contributed to an Eritrean sense of beleaguered national identity. 
Allied troops expelled the Italians on 5 May 1941. The British were in charge of the Horn of Africa for 
a short few years. Paradoxically, while expropriating the equipment and modern infrastructure nec-
essary for the modern economy that Eritrea had become, the British almost casually repealed the 
racist laws, extended secondary education and, eventually,27 opened up political liberties, permitting 
political organisations and trade unions. Negash and Wrong both refer to a common Eritrean saying: 
During the Italian period the rule was: eat but do not talk. The British changed the rule to: talk but do 
not eat. In the 1960s a third experience was added, namely the Ethiopian experience where the rule 
was: do not eat and do not talk.28 
 
OŶ ϭϱ “epteŵďeƌ ϭϵϱϮ, the UN, afƌaid of opeŶiŶg the PaŶdoƌa͛s ďoǆ of self-determination in Africa, 
handed back an impoverished but politically and economically literate and nationally-conscious 
Eritrea to Ethiopia, a country racked by rural starvation and still ruled by one man backed by 
medieval laws: ͞a hǇeŶa had ďeeŶ put ǁith a goat aŶd the ƌesult ǁas oďǀious͟.29 Eritreans found 
their appeals for UN support for self-determination ignored. Similarly, the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), set up in 1963 and located in Addis Ababa, giving Haile Selassie much prestige, had 
adopted a policy of not disturbing imperial borders. Tedla30 states: In the end the resort to military 
solutioŶs to ͞ƌeĐtifǇ͟ a peƌĐeiǀed ŶatioŶal Đase Đaŵe afteƌ the failuƌe of the iŶteƌŶatioŶal diploŵaĐǇ.  
It took over 30 years of guerrilla war to achieve independence. Several different and often 
contradictory geopolitical factors favoured Ethiopia. First, the US poured military aid into Ethiopia, 
eŶaďliŶg Ethiopia to ŵaiŶtaiŶ ͚the laƌgest ŵilitaƌǇ estaďlishŵeŶt iŶ AfƌiĐa͛.31 Th US maintained a 
sophisticated listening station on the Hamassien plateau (in Eritrea) and used Ethiopia as a staging-
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post for Israeli flights to South Africa, and as a counterweight to USSR support for Somalia. In 1974 
Haile Selassie, failing to deal with a terrible famine, was overthrown by the Derg, a group of army 
officers from which Mengistu Haile Mariam soon emerged. They too refused to countenance 
Eritrean independence. The Eritrean independence movement grew significantly in this period, able 
to steal or win Ethiopian military equipment from a demoralised army. In response, the USA poured 
in more military aid, but as the Eritreans began attacking Americans, decided to withdraw. In 1975 
Ethiopia very rapidly acquired the support of the USSR, at the very moment when the USA was 
arguably at its weakest with withdrawal from Vietnam, and with Soviet-supported liberation 
movements at the height of their prestige, as Angola and Mozambique threw off Portuguese control. 
Soviet support for Ethiopia was disastrous for the Eritrean independence movement. For the USSR, 
Ethiopia could not be considered a colonial power (which had been how the Eritrean independence 
movement had theorised their struggle)32 aŶd theƌefoƌe ͚theƌe ǁas Ŷo iŶsuƌgeŶĐǇ͛. “oŵalia had 
thrown USSR advisers out and invited US support, and so, as these neighbouring hostile countries 
each changed sides in the Cold War, Ethiopia received huge USSR arms shipments, and the Eritrean 
liberation movement had to retreat comprehensively into the Sahel mountains.  
Keneally recounts33 the resourceful and determined organisation of civilised Western standards of 
education and high-quality health-care along with the highly-controlled social and political life that 
took place in hiding. This experience influenced a whole generation of Eritrean Fighters and their 
children, erasing cultural, ethnic and religious origins, leaving them with a complete sense of 
certainty and habituated to a war-based austere collective lifestyle. Both Wrong and Negash 
predicted that transition to ruling their country during peacetime would take maybe a generation to 
achieve,34 aŶd, foƌ WƌoŶg, this ǁas the oƌigiŶ of the EƌitƌeaŶ ƌegiŵe͛s poliĐǇ of self-reliance,35 and 
thus the path taken by the regime since then. Already, even in that period in the mountains, dissent 
was ruthlessly eliminated.36  
Meanwhile the lack of agricultural reform in Ethiopia led in 1984 to the huge drought and 
subsequent famine which left 1 million dead, and which required significant Western aid.37 By 1988 
the EthiopiaŶ aƌŵǇ stood at ϮϱϬ,ϬϬϬ ƌegulaƌs aŶd ϮϬϬ,ϬϬϬ ŵilitiaŵeŶ, ĐostiŶg half the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
revenues, but its morale was crumbling. In the wider world, the dismantling of the Soviet Union and 
liberation of the Baltic states reignited wider support for the right to self-determination. The Eritrean 
Fighters comprehensively defeated Ethiopian forces at the Battle of Afabet 1988, after which the 
world began to listen to the Eritreans. Meanwhile another Ethiopian independence movement, the 
TigƌaǇ People͛s LiďeƌatioŶ FƌoŶt ;TPLFͿ had suĐĐeeded iŶ ϭϵϴϵ iŶ eǆpelliŶg the EthiopiaŶ aƌŵǇ fƌoŵ 
the province of Tigray. It then united with the EthiopiaŶ People͛s DeŵoĐƌatiĐ MoǀeŵeŶt ;EPDMͿ aŶd 
thus tƌaŶsfoƌŵed itself iŶto the EthiopiaŶ People͛s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and it 
was just a matter of time before this, allied to the EPLF, would defeat the Mengistu regime. 
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Mengistu escaped to Zimbabwe. A new Ethiopian government under Meles Zenawi gave up 
Ethiopia͛s Đlaiŵ to the ‘ed “ea coastline and agreed to hold a referendum on Eritrean 
independence.  
In 1993, after independence, the new Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki was sternly critical of the 
UN, aŶd also aĐĐused the OAU of haǀiŶg ͚failed to deliǀeƌ oŶ its ďƌaǀe pƌoŶouŶĐeŵeŶts on human 
ƌights aŶd eĐoŶoŵiĐ deǀelopŵeŶt͛.38 A multiparty constitution was drafted, reconstruction started, 
independent media were permitted, and elections were promised. But neither the constitutional 
conference or any elections were held, and accounts suggest that the intolerance of dissent was not 
much lessened after independence.39 
In May 1998 Eritrea and Ethiopia contested Badme, a border village. War rapidly broke out, and 
Eritrea was labelled the aggressor. Wrong compares Eritrea to Israel and Rwanda – the small country 
͚ďuŶgliŶg the suďtle ĐhalleŶges of peaĐe͛.40 That war engaged over 500,000 troops and displaced 
600,000 people, the worst war ever seen in Africa. Ethiopia deported over 70,000 Eritreans and 
alleged Eritreans, even those with Ethiopian passports.41 The fighting ceased in 2000, but UN troops 
remain deployed on the frontier.42 Eritrea lost Ethiopian markets, which accounted for over 70% of 
Eritrean trade.  
The outside world began to see public signs of dissent. Three major EPLF figures, Mesfin Hagos, 
Petros Solomon and Haile Woldensae, issued the Berlin Manifesto in 2001. This was supported by 
the so-called Group of 15, who were all promptly detained.43 When the EU protested, the Italian 
ambassador was expelled. From then, Eritrea has been a virtually closed country, with no 
independent media, strict limitations on foreign NGOs44 and strict control on exit visas. In 2002, the 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt set up the Waƌsai Yekalo DeǀelopŵeŶt CaŵpaigŶ ;͚ďeaƌeƌ of the legaĐǇ of the ǁaƌ of 
iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe͛: WDYCͿ uŶdeƌ ǁhiĐh ŵost people must work under the direction of the state. 
Effectively the whole economy consists of forced labour on low pay insufficient to support a family. 
Every child leaving school must go straight to the Sawa military training camp, and then join the 
military. Regular street roundups and shoot-to-kill at the border attempts to mop up those trying to 
escape.  Those who are caught, along with those facing religious persecution, are sent to Sawa and 
imprisoned, suffering months in metal lorry containers in the blistering desert, facing sexual abuse 
aŶd ǀioleŶt tƌeatŵeŶt. This ƌeĐeŶt histoƌǇ of Eƌitƌea as ͚oŶe ďig laŶd pƌisoŶ͛ ŵust ďe aŵoŶg the ŵost 
eǆaŵiŶed aŶd ŵost ƌepoƌted oŶ, iŶ the WesteƌŶ ǁoƌld. Not iŶ the ǁoƌld͛s seƌious ŵedia, oƌ at Daǀos 
or at the G20, but in the thousaŶds of asǇluŵ appeals heaƌd iŶ tƌiďuŶals iŶ ͚destiŶatioŶ ĐouŶtƌies͛ 
from Europe to Canada.  
Meanwhile, geopolitically, Eritrea continued to be ostracised. In July-August 2006 Ethiopian troops 
ǁeƌe seŶt iŶto “oŵalia to fight the ͚IslaŵiĐ Couƌts͛ ǁhich had briefly taken control of Mogadishu. 
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Somalia's transitional government accused Eritrea of sending troops and weapons to the Islamic 
Couƌts, aŶd at the tiŵe Eƌitƌea͛s iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt ǁas suspeĐted as ďoth pƌo-Islamic and as an excuse to 
fight Ethiopia. Then in 2009 the UN Security Council passed resolution 1907, including an embargo 
and targeted sanctions, over concerns that the Eritrean government was providing finance and 
weapons to Al Shabaab, as well as backing rebels in Ethiopia and elsewhere in the region. In 2012 
the UN MoŶitoƌiŶg Gƌoup ƌepoƌted: ͚Eƌitƌea has ƌeduĐed its suppoƌt foƌ the al Qaeda-allied al 
Shabaab militant group in Somalia under international pressure, but still violates U.N. Security 
Council resolutions and remains a destabilizing iŶflueŶĐe͛.45  
Eritrea is just now slowly being brought out of international isolation. 46 In June 2018 a change of 
government in Ethiopia has brought what looks like a true change of direction in that country, 
including a release of political prisoners and openings towards political opponents in Oromo. 
Ethiopia reestablished diplomatic relations with Eritrea. The presidents exchanged visits and agreed 
a formal end to the border war. Subsequently Eritrea and Somalia reestablished diplomatic ties after 
decades of hostility. Eritrea now provides bases for Saudi Arabia and UAE in their war in Yemen. 
European countries have also been making overtures to Eritrea, primarily to reduce the numbers of 
Eritrean refugees fleeing into Europe.47 However, it has not yet introduced any democratic reforms 
nor proposed an end to compulsory military service – and the opening of the border into Ethiopia 
has led to ͚up to ϱϬϬ͛ ĐƌossiŶg daily. The US continues to list Eritrea as one of the worst countries for 
ƌeligious peƌseĐutioŶ, oǁiŶg to its pƌohiďitioŶ of PeŶteĐostalisŵ aŶd Jehoǀah͛s WitŶesses.48  
A recent World Bank report49 describes Eritrea as ͚one of the least developed countries in the world…. 
In 2012, Eritrea’s Human Development Index was below the average for countries in the Low Human 
Development group and below average for countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region.’ Eritrea is said 
to suffeƌ fƌoŵ ͚ĐhƌoŶiĐ fisĐal defiĐits͛ ǁhiĐh ŵust haǀe ďeeŶ due to the heaǀǇ ŵilitaƌǇ speŶdiŶg 
duƌiŶg the ǁaƌ ǁith Ethiopia, desĐƌiďed ďǇ the Woƌld BaŶk as ͚ƌegioŶal iŶseĐuƌitǇ͛. AgƌiĐultuƌe 
occupies two-thirds of the population, in decline because of increasing drought in the region. ‘… 
Eritrea’s economic conditions remain challenging as a result of the global economic slowdown, a 
difficult macroeconomic situation, and limited physical and human capital. High budget deficits, 
resulting mainly from large military expenditure, and a large social safety net, restrict the 
government’s ability to maintain prudent fiscal targets. … The majority of the population are young, 
and youth unemployment and underemployment is high. Half of the youth cohort, though well 
educated, have no access to jobs.  
This skates eǆpeƌtlǇ aƌouŶd the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s deĐades of laĐk of self-determination and ostracism by the 
world, its lack of democratic rights and its significant human rights abuses. It is not clear, for 
eǆaŵple, if the Woƌld BaŶk͛s ͚laƌge soĐial safetǇ Ŷet͛ ƌefeƌs to Eƌitƌea͛s compulsory national service. 
The report does not mention the thousands of young people who flee. What the Global Compact 
and other people-centred approaches face therefore is not just the complex reality on the ground. 
They must reckon with the way that instances of global capitalism like the World Bank, and instances 
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of global governance like the UN and the OAU, as well as Middle Eastern powers, the EU and 
iŶdiǀidual EuƌopeaŶ ͚destiŶatioŶ ĐouŶtƌies͛, daŶĐe aƌouŶd the ƌealitǇ aŶd theiƌ oǁŶ past aŶd pƌeseŶt 
involvement in it, blaming and sanctioning, while extracting and using what they need. Critiquing the 
͚Khaƌtouŵ pƌojeĐt͛, iŶ ǁhiĐh the EU pƌoŵises fuŶds foƌ deǀelopŵeŶt iŶ ƌetuƌŶ foƌ AfƌiĐaŶ ĐouŶtƌies͛ 
undertaking to manage migration, Hala Al-Karib50 said: Euƌope͛s effoƌts oŶ migration are too focused 
on trying to stop people from moving. They treat illegal cross-border movement as an issue of law 
enforcement rather than as a symptom of deep-seated goǀeƌŶaŶĐe aŶd eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ pƌoďleŵs…͛ 
 
3. Italy - a ͚traŶsit couŶtry͛ 
For EƌitƌeaŶs to ƌeaĐh a ͚safe͛ ĐouŶtƌǇ theǇ ŵust suƌǀiǀe a ϮϬϬϬ-mile journey across the desert, 
risking enslavement, rape and death from criminal gangs who control traffic through Sudan and 
Libya51 to the Mediterranean beaches, then risking death by drowning to arrive on European soil. 
This means Italy, Greece, Malta, Cyprus or Spain. Many set off to other countries in Europe, but, 
since 1997, when the Dublin Convention was signed by 12 EU states, those states can require that 
the state of fiƌst asǇluŵ ͚take ďaĐk͛ aŶǇ asǇluŵ-seeker claiming elsewhere.52 Conditions for refugees 
in Greece and then Italy became intolerable. Asylum-seekeƌs faĐiŶg ͚DuďliŶ͛ pƌoĐeduƌes ďegaŶ to 
resist removal back to Greece, and then Italy.  
The case of M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece53 held that the pƌesuŵptioŶ that aŶ EU Meŵďeƌ “tate͛s 
reception conditioŶs ǁould ŵeet EU ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts ǁas ƌeďuttaďle: aŶd that a ͚ƌetuƌŶiŶg͛ “tate 
ǁould ďe iŶ ďƌeaĐh if ͚it kŶeǁ oƌ it ought to haǀe kŶoǁŶ͛ aďout poteŶtiallǇ ŶoŶĐoŵpliaŶt ĐoŶditioŶs 
iŶ the ͚ƌeĐeiǀiŶg “tate͛. EǀideŶĐe of ͚ŶoŶ-ĐoŵpliaŶt ĐoŶditioŶs͛ ďegaŶ to eŵeƌge in Italy. Our clients54 
detained in the Oakington detention centre55 recounted being met on a beach on Lampedusa or in 
southern Italy, being given a train ticket and told go to Milan, or Rome. Some were taken into 
reception centres (where some faced ill-treatment and abuse) but then asked to leave. Some arrived 
in Rome or more northern cities and faced sleeping out on river banks, or in derelict office buildings 
and factories, along with people already granted asylum, and Italian and EU citizens and their 
families who were unable to find work or housiŶg iŶ theiƌ ͚oǁŶ ĐouŶtƌǇ͛.56  
In my own case, EW,57 heaƌd iŶ ϮϬϬϵ, I atteŵpted to aƌgue that ItalǇ͛s foƌŵal asǇluŵ ƌeĐeptioŶ 
provision of 3000 bed spaces clearly could not cope with over 30,000 asylum-seekers arriving each 
year by sea alone. We lost the case, but recently the UK courts have accepted that conditions in Italy 
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for asylum-seekeƌs ǁould lead to aŶ aƌt ϯ ďƌeaĐh foƌ a ͚ǀulŶeƌaďle͛ appliĐaŶt aŶd thus it ǁould ďe 
unlawful to return them.58 
The Italian background59 
How can it be that Italy, the eighth largest economy in the world and a founder member of the EU, is 
in this position? First, Italy came late to statehood (1861) and before that only the northern parts of 
the future state enjoyed any real industrial development, limited by the lack of coal and iron among 
other factors. Most of the country was dependent on small-scale agriculture which had not seen 
͚laŶd ƌefoƌŵ oƌ sĐieŶtifiĐ iŶŶoǀatioŶ as iŶ ϭϴth-century Britain. Illiteracy was widespread, while in 
Britain and Germany school education was compulsory. Huge numbers emigrated, mostly to the 
United States.  Around 26 million Italians left during 1870-1970, mostly between 1880–1914; 
considered by some as the biggest mass migration of contemporary times.60  
ItalǇ͛s Noƌth-South divide underlay big political divisions and is still of major significance. During the 
late 19th century trade union and socialist organisations grew in the North, while in the South, largely 
controlled by Catholic organisations, poverty and starvation were seen. Governments were weak 
coalitions, often corrupt. Nationalism and iƌƌedeŶtisŵ attƌaĐted ǀotes. The ͚tǁo ‘ed Ǉeaƌs͛ ϭϵϭϵ-20 
of mass strikes and factory occupations led to the creation of the Italian Communist Party. 
Meanwhile Mussolini, earlier an active socialist, led the Fascists, who after brutal actions against 
trade unionists and socialists took power in 1922, completely crushing any opposition. The 
Communist Party was significant in the Resistance against Fascism and against the German 
occupation once Italy changed sides during the second world war.  
At the end of the ǁaƌ ďoth “oĐialist aŶd CoŵŵuŶist leadeƌs ;uŶdeƌ the heel of “taliŶ͛s ͚soĐialisŵ iŶ 
oŶe ĐouŶtƌǇ͛ poliĐǇͿ, agƌeed to a goǀeƌŶŵeŶt of ŶatioŶal ƌeĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ, iŶ ǁhiĐh CoŵŵuŶist leadeƌ 
Togliatti was minister of justice and another Communist was minister of finance. The postwar years 
saw waves of land occupations, strikes and factory occupations even greater than in the 2 Red years. 
But the CoŵŵuŶist paƌtǇ did Ŷot suppoƌt these, ďlaŵiŶg the ͚ƌeal oďjeĐtiǀe situatioŶ͛. Fiƌst, the 
postwar partition of the world agƌeed iŶ ϭϵϰϱ at Potsdaŵ ͚gaǀe͛ ItalǇ to the Đapitalist ďloĐ, aloŶg 
ǁith GƌeeĐe, ǁhile the U““‘ ǁas peƌŵitted to ͚take͛ Yugoslaǀia aloŶg ǁith the BaltiĐ states. This 
ŵeaŶt that ItaliaŶ ǁoƌkeƌs͛ aŶd peasaŶts͛ stƌuggles had to take seĐoŶd plaĐe to the ƌeĐonstruction 
of Italian capitalism. The Party also feared the loss of support from the rural South. The Communist 
party was soon excluded from the government, and there followed 40 years of Christian Democrat 
domination of Italian politics. Class violence continued, ruthlessly put down by armed police. The 
Communist party continued to grow, acquiring a national newspaper, a publishing house, other 
cultural activities and great popularity. They also achieved control of a number of large 
municipalities, effectively dragging it into the clientelism and corruption of the sottogoverno (the 
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issuing of public works contracts and the like) and limiting its claim to be untainted by the corruption 
and degeneration of the Christian Democrat-controlled government.61  
Through this period the Italian economy grew significantly, assisted by US postwar loans,62 the 
general increase in world trade, free trade agreements and the huge increase in US consumer 
spending, but also helped by low wages and job insecurity. There was no shortage of workers. 
Besides unemployed industrial workers, emigration from the rural South reached almost biblical 
proportions. From 1951 to 1967 nearly 9 million workers plus their families left the land – the 
pooƌest thiƌd of ItalǇ͛s populatioŶ oŶ the ŵoǀe. This ǁas effeĐtiǀelǇ the Noƌth͛s fiƌst eǆpeƌieŶĐe of 
immigration – and the southern emigrants were treated in much the same way as the Caribbean 
͚WiŶdƌush͛ aƌƌiǀals ǁeƌe iŶ BƌitaiŶ.  
In 1959 FIAT dismissed its entire Mirafiori assembly line workforce and replaced them with new 
ǇouŶg ǁoƌkeƌs fƌoŵ the “outh, ǁoƌkiŶg to pƌeĐaƌious ĐoŶtƌaĐts ǁheƌe ͚aŶ houƌ oŶ the liŶe͛ 
coŶsisted of ϭϬϬ ŵiŶutes͛ ǁoƌth of ǁoƌk.63 In a period in which wages in Germany had gone up by 
25% and in France by 17%, wages in the Italian North increased by only 11.7%. This growing worker 
unrest led the government, with the support of the Pope64 and the US, to invite the Socialists back 
into government. 65, 66 The soĐialist histoƌiaŶ aŶd politiĐiaŶ TaŵďuƌƌaŶo said ͚ǁe ŵust keep the 
“oĐialist paƌtǇ iŶ the ƌealŵs of Đapitalisŵ, oƌ Đapitalisŵ ǁill leaǀe the ƌealŵs of deŵoĐƌaĐǇ͛.67 The US 
regarded the policy as a success precisely to the extent that Communist party influence in Italian 
affairs was reduced.68 
IŶ the ͚hot autuŵŶ͛ ϭϵϲϴ-ϲϵ the ͚Ŷeǁ ǁoƌkeƌs͛, ŵostlǇ those ƌeĐƌuited fƌoŵ ƌuƌal southeƌŶ ItalǇ, 
who had organised outside the traditional trade union movement and who were not trammelled by 
the traditions of party discipline of the Communist left, evolved new methods of struggle – lightning 
strikes, strikes in different parts of the factory, sabotage of machinery and products. They demanded 
flat ƌates of paǇ aŶd ǁoƌkeƌs͛ ĐoŶtƌol of the speed of the liŶe. “oŵe ďig ĐoŶĐessioŶs ǁeƌe aĐhieǀed 
including index-linked wage rates69 and the right to organise, but those struggles petered out as the 
eĐoŶoŵǇ ǁeŶt iŶto ƌeĐessioŶ iŶ the eaƌlǇ ϳϬ͛s, affeĐted ďǇ the oil Đƌisis. This iŶ tuƌŶ led to a huge ƌe-
entry of ex-rural workers back to the countryside and the South. Because wages had been kept low, 
Italian exports continued to rise, while public spending in Italy stagnated and consumer spending 
shuddered to a halt. 
In response to these developments, the US intensified a programme of supporting Italian political 
parties from the Christian Democrats rightwards, while the Communist party under Berlinguer 
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proposed the clearest expression of class collaboration by a leftwing party anywhere – the Historic 
Compromise. This determined that the Communist party would not enter a government without the 
Christian Democrats. This left the working class with nowhere to go politically, and the Christian 
Democrat-dominated administration continued for another fifteen years. 
The consequent exhaustion and frustration of the left showed itself during that period in two ways. 
Away from the trade unions and the large left parties, small groups pursued mostly unrelated 
ĐaŵpaigŶs ƌaŶgiŶg fƌoŵ ŵass oĐĐupatioŶ of eŵptǇ apaƌtŵeŶts, ͚self-ƌeduĐtioŶ͛ of paǇŵeŶts for rent 
and utilities, carrying out formal work for no pay (such as cleaning out a hospital ward or cooking 
aŶd pƌoǀidiŶg food to patieŶtsͿ aŶd theŶ foƌŵallǇ deŵaŶdiŶg ǁages foƌ the ǁoƌk; ͚pƌoletaƌiaŶ 
eǆpƌopƌiatioŶs͛ ;i.e. ŵass thefts fƌoŵ supeƌŵaƌketsͿ, and the setting up of small cooperatives and 
ǁoƌkeƌs͛ ŵaƌkets. This peƌiod saǁ the ƌise of feŵiŶisŵ aŶd the slogaŶ ͚the peƌsoŶal is politiĐal,͛ – 
which led to the further fragmentation of the organised left.70 This period also saw the rise of armed 
attacks and political murders, carried out by several different groups on both the left and the right – 
the ͚Yeaƌs of Lead͛. “uďseƋueŶtlǇ, ŵaŶǇ foƌŵeƌ ‘ed Bƌigades aŶd otheƌs ͚ƌepeŶted͛, aŶd otheƌ 
former left political leaders joined the Green Party, the Radical Party, or left politics altogether.  
Perry Anderson recounts the virtual collapse of most of the traditional parties of government in the 
early 1990s as corruption scandals erupted, in which at one point more than half of the Senate and 
Chamber of Deputies had been served notices of legal proceedings. A referendum was held which 
abolished the system of proportional representation. In the elections which followed the Christian 
Democrat and Socialist parties disintegrated, with major figures like Craxi, Socialist prime minister 
foƌ ItalǇ͛s loŶgest post-war government, facing corruption charges.71 
The Communist party, having changed its name after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, had lost half 
its support in the 1992 elections, but subsequently in 1994 looked like the only party left standing. 
However, Silvio Berlusconi, a media boss and tacky showman, launched Forza Italia, and managed to 
make common cause with the two powerful populist regional parties, Lega Nord under Umberto 
Bossi, and Alleanza Nazionale under Gianfranco Fini, and achieve a surprise victory in the 1994 
elections. For Perry Anderson, this grouping gained support precisely because of an appearance of 
freshness, of being unknown quantities – albeit based on quite distinct and even opposing political 
support. The Lega Nord attracted small shopkeepers and small businesses from the North who were 
exasperated with the economic lead ǁeight of ItalǇ͛s uŶdeƌdeǀeloped south, ǁhile AlleaŶza 
Nazionale precisely represented the old clientelism which propped up southern bureaucrats and 
kept their friends and families in work. 
BeƌlusĐoŶi͛s ǀiĐtoƌǇ, ǁith those allies, ǁas a shoĐk, paƌtlǇ also ďeĐause of BeƌlusĐoŶi͛s shaŵeless 
reliance on clear conflicts of constitutional interest as controller of Italian media, especially 
television. He then used his victory to force the passing of specific ad personam laws preventing any 
investigation or prosecution of his own affairs. Unexpectedly, and despite the pursuit of corruption 
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takiŶg aŶ eǆpliĐitlǇ politiĐal foƌŵ iŶ the ŵagistƌates͛ paƌtǇ ͚CleaŶ HaŶds͛, the eleĐtoƌate did Ŷot seeŵ 
to hold this against Berlusconi.72 
However his government did not last long, and elections in 1996 led to an extremely narrow victory 
for a broad coalition (the Olive Tree) led by Romano Prodi. The Berlusconi grouping had polled more 
votes, but that coalition had temporarily broken down. The Prodi government intended to reform 
public life, but its room to manoeuvre was limited by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) requirement 
foƌ ItalǇ to aĐhieǀe eĐoŶoŵiĐ ͚ĐoŶǀeƌgeŶĐe͛ so as to eŶteƌ the EuƌozoŶe. This ƌeƋuiƌed ďƌutal 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ ŵeasuƌes leadiŶg to ItalǇ͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐiŶg the sloǁest gƌoǁth of aŶǇ ŵajoƌ iŶdustƌial 
society, with continuing high levels of unemployment, especially in the South. Continued 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶtal iŶstaďilitǇ aŶd the uŶpopulaƌitǇ of those goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ŵeasuƌes led to BeƌlusĐoŶi͛s 
laŶdslide ƌeeleĐtioŶ iŶ ϮϬϬϭ, agaiŶ suppoƌted ďǇ Bossi aŶd FiŶi, aŶd agaiŶ folloǁed ďǇ BeƌlusĐoŶi͛s 
relentless pursuit of ad personam laws, trying to stay one step ahead from prosecutions by the 
͚CleaŶ HaŶds͛ ŵagistƌates ǁhiĐh ǁeƌe ǁeŶdiŶg theiƌ ǁaǇ thƌough the ItaliaŶ Đouƌts. BƌoadlǇ, that 
government pursued the standard neoliberal policies of privatisation, deregulation, lower taxes and 
a tougher immigration law, as well as assisting in the war in Iraq and, in return for the support of 
Lega Nord, granting the North an element of devolution. Then, fearing unpopularity, that coalition 
changed the electoral system again – and promptly lost the next election.  
The new centre-left government was hit almost immediately by a crisis in the South, which had 
continued to be poor and undeveloped, enduring political corruption and a growing burden of 
organised crime. On this, a UN report73 published in 2011 stated: 
organised crime in Italy - mostly illegal waste disposal, drugs and people trafficking - is 
worth €116 billion a year, equivalent to 7.7 percent of the country's GDP. The scale of the 
problem is far larger than in other industrialised nations - organised crime accounts for 1.3 
percent of the economy in Germany, 1.2 percent in the UK and 2.3 percent in the US. The UN 
notes that crime has short-term positive effects: Money laundering sees dirty income invested 
in small businesses, creating jobs, or saved in banks, easing credit flows and liquidity. But the 
medium and long term effects are destructive. 
A major rubbish collection crisis in Naples in 2007 had exposed the involvement of local Centre-Left 
politicians in organised crime and corruption. At the next elections in 2008 the Centre-Left 
catastrophically lost votes and Berlusconi, Bossi and Fini came back to power, with Lega Nord being 
the main beneficiary. Perry Anderson notes that Lega Nord was by then the oldest party in Italy still 
standing, but still benefiting from their role as the insurgents – the plain-speaking populists. 
Anderson draws up an economic balance sheet for Italy, showing how Italy as at 2011 had a higher 
spending on the machinery of government and lower spending on education and health than 
Germany or France; the legal system is sclerotic, with criminal cases taken an average of 4 years and 
some civil cases taking over 10 years. Infrastructure is poorer than elsewhere in Europe, labour 
productivity has barely increased, and the gap in living standards between North and South has 
widened. GDP per capita had fallen below the Eastern European countries. Thomas Fazi74 says: ͚siŶĐe 
signing the Maastricht treaty Italy has either been stagnating or growing well below the European 
aǀeƌage…siŶĐe the fiŶaŶĐial Đƌisis of ϮϬϬϴ ItalǇ has lost ďetǁeeŶ ϲ aŶd ϳ % of its GDP – the largest 
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loss in the Eurozone after Greece. About 25% of its industrial production has been wiped out…iŶ the 
south thiŶgs aƌe ĐatastƌophiĐ: ǁe aƌe talkiŶg aďout uŶeŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates of ϲϬ to ϳϬ% iŶ soŵe paƌts͛. 
ItalǇ͛s falteƌiŶg eĐoŶoŵǇ aŶd high puďliĐ deďt, Đoŵpaƌed to ͚a giaŶt, ŵaǆed-out Đƌedit Đaƌd taď͛75 
has made it a taƌget of the EU͛s EuƌozoŶe austeƌitǇ ŵeasuƌes. The EU͛s iŶteƌfeƌeŶĐe iŶ ItalǇ͛s 
political and economic life has included allegedly ordering Italy at the height of the Eurozone crisis to 
replace Berlusconi with Matteo Renzi, a technocrat acceptable to them,76 and ordering them to 
redraw their recent budget in terms acceptable to the EU,77 i.e. to introduce more austerity. Recent 
elections have shown a clear divide between supporters of Lega Nord (supported by small 
businesses and traders who want lower taxes) and the Five Star Movement, a new and bizarre 
collection of personalities at first headed by a comedian (supported by primarily by the young 
unemployed from the South who are demanding some kind of economic support). But these two 
groupings, encompassing different collections of national-populist ideas, iŶ ϮϬϭϴ ďeĐaŵe ItalǇ͛s 
coalition government. 
‘etuƌŶiŶg to the Gloďal CoŵpaĐt Đategoƌies, it is iŵpoƌtaŶt to Ŷote that ItalǇ has ďeeŶ a ͚seŶdiŶg͛ 
country until very recently. The first major legislation to control immigration was passed as recently 
as 1998,78 amended by the Bossi-Fini law 2002 no 189, bringing in increased powers of detention 
and expulsion of migrants. Around 600,000 migrants are believed to have reached Italy over the last 
four years, mostly by sea, a big increase since I worked on the case of EW in 2009. Money has been 
spent on increasing the availability of reception accommodation, but still nothing like enough, as 
evidenced in the UK cases of EM79 and SM.80 Both under Berlusconi and more recently Italy has 
shoǁŶ a fƌaŶk hostilitǇ to ͚foƌeigŶeƌs͛ ǁhetheƌ asǇluŵ-seekers, economic migrants, poorer EU 
citizens and marginalised Italian citizens such as Roma. Berlusconi introduced the first restrictions on 
rescuing migrants from the sea.81 He concluded agreements with Ghaddafi to prevent migrants 
leaving Libya, a policy condemned all over Europe. After a brief interlude in which Italy assisted with 
rescue operations and allowed rescued migrants to land in Italian ports, the new minister of the 
interior Salvini, of Lega Nord, has again stepped in to deter the rescue of migrants from the sea, 
prohibiting boats with survivors from berthing in Italian ports. His government has also rounded up 
Roma from camps and expelled them.82 His government has also threatened to expel 600,000 
migrants from Italy.83 
Recently the deputy prime minister and leader of the Five Star Movement Luigi Di Maio has criticised 
France84 for ͚Ŷeǀeƌ haǀiŶg stopped ĐoloŶiziŶg dozeŶs of AfƌiĐaŶ ĐouŶtƌies͛, and using the CFA franc, a 
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colonial era currency backed by the French Treasury, to intervene in and control the economies of 
the Francofone countries85 so that people are forced to emigrate to find a means of living. The CFA 
arrangement obliges those countries to deposit half their foreign exchange reserves in a French 
treasury account, which limits their freedom to develop national economic policies.86 This 
ĐoŶtƌeteŵps, ǁhiĐh has led to FƌaŶĐe͛s ǁithdƌaǁal of its aŵďassadoƌ to ItalǇ, goes ǁideƌ thaŶ 
concerns about migration, since in June last year French President Macron described populists as 
͚ƌisiŶg like lepƌosǇ͛ all oǀeƌ Euƌope.87 
However these Italian complaints, however rudimentary their economic basis, and with whatever 
motives, do at least suggest that more complex international eĐoŶoŵiĐ poliĐies ŵight lie ďehiŶd ͚the 
ŵigƌaŶt pƌoďleŵ͛. What ŵust also ďe ĐoŶsideƌed is the iŵpaĐt of ItalǇ͛s peƌsistiŶg Noƌth-South 
divide. Migration to look for work, whether to the North of Italy or beyond, mainly in Germany and 
Switzerland, has been the experience of a large proportion of Italians from the south for over 100 
years: and in times of recession many of these are forced to return home as unable to survive away 
from home with no wages. Thus the small southern settlements coping with significant arrivals of 
foreign migrants will from time to time already be under strain from local high unemployment, 
swelled by the return of local emigrants hit by recessions elsewhere. One account I submitted in my 
case of EW88 concerned the small Southern town of Rosarno, whose economy is largely based on 
fruit-picking. Employers were not concerned about the legal status of who they employed, and so 
many refugees, asylum-seekers and refused asylum-seekers worked alongside local people. In 2009 
there was already tension between local people and migrants, and at that time a demonstration 
showed solidarity between all the workers regardless of status. However, less than a year later, with 
tensions exacerbated by a drop in the market, Rosarno is reported to have evicted and driven out 
eǀeƌǇ ŵigƌaŶt fƌoŵ the aƌea, aĐhieǀiŶg ͚the oŶlǇ puƌelǇ ǁhite toǁŶ iŶ the ǁoƌld͛.89 
Also fuŶdaŵeŶtal is ItalǇ͛s uŶiƋue politiĐal past aŶd pƌeseŶt. PeƌƌǇ AŶdeƌsoŶ ĐoŶĐludes his Italy 
chapter of The New Old World by reviewing the calamitous collapse in left-wing politics in Italy, the 
country which had had the largest and best-organised communist and socialist parties in Europe, the 
Communist party in addition having its own major intellectual heritage in the writings of Antonio 
Gramsci. With that having been abandoned largely by free-standing decisions of the party leaders, 
and with the left and the traditions of the left no longer enjoying any social weight in Italy, the 
ĐhaŶĐe of deǀelopiŶg a politiĐal deďate aďout ͚ǁho ďeloŶgs͛, oƌ aĐhieǀiŶg the politiĐal solidaƌitǇ ǁith 
migrants necessary for political suppoƌt foƌ ŵigƌaŶts͛ ƌights is ǀiƌtuallǇ ŶoŶeǆisteŶt. Without 
gƌappliŶg ǁith ItalǇ͛s uŶeǀeŶ, uŶeƋual aŶd uŶsuĐĐessful economy and its resulting divided and angry 
political landscape, the Global Compact approach will fall on stony ground in Italy. 
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4. The ͚destiŶatioŶ couŶtry͛ – the UK 
IŶ the IŶtƌoduĐtioŶ I suŵŵaƌised the UK͛s ƌole as a ͚seŶdiŶg͛ ĐouŶtƌǇ: eǆpoƌtiŶg ͚ƌuleƌs of Eŵpiƌe͛, 
adŵiŶistƌatoƌs aŶd ŵilitaƌǇ peƌsoŶŶel all oǀeƌ the ǁoƌld, ͚seŶdiŶg͛ despeƌate eŵigƌaŶts esĐapiŶg the 
consequences of 18th and 19th ĐeŶtuƌǇ ͚laŶd ƌefoƌŵ͛ oŶ the ŵaiŶlaŶd aŶd ďƌutal ŶegleĐt iŶ IƌelaŶd, 
forcibly deporting convicts to Australia in the 19th ĐeŶtuƌǇ, aŶd afteƌ the seĐoŶd ǁoƌld ǁaƌ ͚seŶdiŶg͛ 
hopeful economic migrants mainly to the Dominions and more recently to continental Europe. How-
ever, now the UK is pre-eŵiŶeŶtlǇ seeŶ as, aŶd sees itself as, a ͚destiŶatioŶ͛ ĐouŶtƌǇ. A ϮϬϭϴ ƌepoƌt 
from the Migration Observatory90 states that as at 2017 some 14% of the UK population were born 
abroad, the main foreign nationalities being Poland (at 16% by far the highest proportion), India 
;ϲ.ϲ%Ϳ, PakistaŶ ;ϱ.ϲ%Ϳ, IƌelaŶd ;ϱ.ϲ%Ϳ. The ƌepoƌt Ŷotes that the UK͛s foƌeigŶ-born population has 
nearly doubled since 2004, from 5.3m to around 9.4m, largely arising from the influx of EU nationals 
from the 8 new countries joining the EU in 2004.91 Before that the largest group of foreign-born im-
ŵigƌaŶts to the UK ǁeƌe fƌoŵ the ‘epuďliĐ of IƌelaŶd. NotaďlǇ, the ͚WiŶdƌush geŶeƌatioŶ͛ of aƌƌiǀals 
of ͚ĐitizeŶs of the UK aŶd ĐoloŶies͛ aŶd CoŵŵoŶǁealth ĐitizeŶs fƌoŵ the CaƌiďďeaŶ aŶd fƌoŵ AfƌiĐa 
do not figure in the top ten foreign nationalities present in the UK: beyond those listed above, the 
list consists mainly of people from other EU countries. 
 
I stated in the Introduction that the UK has never truly offered a welcome, or any sustained practical 
assistance with integration, to other than a few specific categories of incomers.92 In relation to refu-
gees, sentimental references are often made to the welcoming of Huguenot refugees in the 16th and 
17th centuries, but, firstly, these were Protestant co-religionists being persecuted on the European 
continent in a wider struggle against Catholic powers (and so potential allies of England), and, sec-
ondly, even they were not always welcome, and from time to time subject to quasi-͚hostile eŶǀiƌoŶ-
ŵeŶt͛ ŵeasuƌes as adǀeƌse eĐoŶoŵiĐ ĐoŶditioŶs affeĐted the Ŷatiǀe EŶglish populatioŶ.93 Similar 
seŶtiŵeŶtal ƌefeƌeŶĐes aƌe ŵade iŶ the ŵodeƌŶ peƌiod to the UK͛s ͚ǁelĐoŵe͛ of ƌefugees, ďut ;as iŶ 
Home Office press releases) this is always prefaced ďǇ the ǁoƌd ͚geŶuiŶe͛. OffiĐial ƌesistaŶĐe to aĐ-
cepting Jews escaping pogroms in Russia and Eastern Europe towards the end of the 19th century, 
aŶd offiĐial ƌesistaŶĐe to offeƌiŶg ƌefuge to Jeǁs esĐapiŶg fƌoŵ Nazi GeƌŵaŶǇ iŶ the ϯϬ͛s, is ǁell-doc-
umented. UK asylum legal practitioners over recent decades can document the UK Home Office re-
sistaŶĐe to eǀeƌǇ ŵodeƌŶ ǁaǀe of ƌefugees, fƌoŵ those esĐapiŶg PiŶoĐhet͛s Chile iŶ the ϳϬ͛s, Taŵils 
fƌoŵ “ƌi LaŶka iŶ the ϴϬ͛s, aŶd people esĐapiŶg fƌoŵ eǀeƌǇ suďseƋueŶt ǁaƌ aŶd ͚failed state͛ iŶĐlud-
iŶg “oŵalia, AfghaŶistaŶ, IƌaƋ, the CoŶgo aŶd elseǁheƌe. The goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s fiƌst ƌespoŶse is alǁaǇs 
to ensure that nationals of such countries require visas to enter the UK. Then, very quickly, the 
Home Office evolves a standard response to the typical asylum claims from each troubled country or 
ǁaƌ zoŶe: the appliĐaŶt ͚is Ŷot fƌoŵ that ĐouŶtƌǇ͛; ͚ǁas oŶlǇ a loǁ-leǀel aĐtiǀist͛ iŶ that politiĐal oƌ-
gaŶisatioŶ; ͚ǁould ďe aďle to safelǇ ƌeloĐate iŶteƌŶallǇ͛ to aǀoid peƌseĐutioŶ; the ƌape and abuse suf-
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feƌed ͚ǁas the ǁoƌk of ƌogue poliĐeŵeŶ aŶd Ŷot tǇpiĐal͛; the appliĐaŶt͛s aĐĐouŶt ͚is ǀague aŶd iŶĐoŶ-
sisteŶt͛ aŶd his ͚ĐƌediďilitǇ is ǁeakeŶed ďeĐause he did Ŷot Đlaiŵ asǇluŵ iŶ the fiƌst safe ĐouŶtƌǇ͛ aŶd 
so on. These issues, collectively refeƌƌed to as the Hoŵe OffiĐe ͚Đultuƌe of disďelief͛, haǀe ďeeŶ the 
subject of many reports over 3 decades,94 but, fundamentally, nothing has changed. 
 
The numbers of asylum-seekers arriving in the UK have never been large, increasing from a few hun-
dred a year in the 1980s to a high point in 2001 of just under 100,000 and falling subsequently to a 
current level of around 30,000 a year. This is far lower than experienced by several other European 
countries, and of course tiny when compared to the millions of Syrians arriving in Lebanon, Jordan, 
Turkey, the hundreds of thousands of Afghans arriving in Iran and Pakistan, and of Rohingya arriving 
in Bangladesh. To understand the political drivers of the restrictive laws and negative policy frame-
ǁoƌk of the UK͛s asǇluŵ sǇsteŵ ǁe Ŷeed to plaĐe ͚asǇluŵ͛ iŶto the UK͛s ǁideƌ politiĐal ƌespoŶse to 
͚iŵŵigƌatioŶ͛, ǁhiĐh iŶ tuƌŶ requires a broader look at the vicissitudes of UK economic and political 
life since the second world war, highlighting the circumstances of each cohort of arrivals. It is imme-
diatelǇ Đleaƌ that, uŶlike iŶ the Đase of ItalǇ, foƌ the UK ͚iŵŵigƌatioŶ͛ aŶd ͚ƌaĐe͛ haǀe ďeeŶ pƌoďleŵa-
tised categories virtually since the end of the second world war. 
 
The UK background95 
 
A. the ϱ0͛s aŶd ϲ0͛s: ͞they͛ve stopped talkiŶg aďout it iŶ the Đluďs͟ 
It seems extraordinary now to note that precisely as the Empire Windrush was crossing the Atlantic, 
Parliament was debating what became the British Nationality Act 1948, where a major concern was 
that without providing for an Empire-ǁide ĐitizeŶship ;CitizeŶ of the UK aŶd ColoŶiesͿ CaŶada͛s Ŷeǁ 
citizenship laws would lead to a tangle of different nationalities within the British Empire. It scarcely 
occurred to anyone in that debate that ͚the Ŷatiǀes͛ fƌoŵ the ͚ĐoloŶies͛ ǁould haǀe the teŵeƌitǇ to 
turn up in Britain and expect to work and live here. Peter Hennessy96 shows how both Conservatives 
and Labour were disconcerted at the effects of the arrival of the first West Indian migrants in 1948. 
During the Attlee and Churchill governments discussions took place on controlling Commonwealth 
immigration, always foundering on the postwar economic need for migrant labour and the 
determination not to control immigration from the old white Dominions. David Widgery, in his book 
The Left in Britain 1956-1968,97 sums up the period by noting that ͚iŵŵigration from the West Indies 
reached a peak in 1958-60 and for Asians in 1963-ϰ, alŵost pƌeĐiselǇ iŶ tiŵe ǁith the joďs aǀailaďle͛. 
He ĐoŶtiŶued suĐĐiŶĐtlǇ: ͚the appetite for labour was keen enough to bring women workers and 
immigrants into the workforce fƌoŵ theiƌ siŶks aŶd ǀillages͛. 
The 1958 Notting Hill and Nottingham race riots led to the first official Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
response: 98  
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͚…the ŵost seƌious soĐial pƌoďleŵs faĐiŶg iŵŵigƌaŶts to BƌitaiŶ ǁeƌe those ǁhiĐh had faĐed 
working people for many years and caused hardship to substantial sections of the British 
puďliĐ as a ǁhole … iŵŵigƌaŶts Đould ďest serve their own interests by taking part on an 
equal footing with other members of the trade union movement which represented their day 
to day interests as workers, and, through branches and trades councils, provided a means of 
expression in local and natioŶal life͛.  
It Đould ďe aƌgued that this shoǁed a solidaƌitǇ of Đlass ďetǁeeŶ ǁhite aŶd ͚Đolouƌed͛ ǁoƌkeƌs, ďut if 
so it was very partial, ignoring the controls on entry of wives and children, additional barriers to 
housing for immigrant families, and not formally confronting racist and prejudiced attitudes amongst 
the white workforce. 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 brought in the first restrictions, requiring future 
Commonwealth immigrants to show that they had work. Several national unions and many senior 
Labour figures had formally opposed that Act, but after the bruising election campaign of 196499 felt 
foƌĐed to ŵake a shaƌp ĐhaŶge iŶ offiĐial paƌtǇ poliĐǇ. Laďouƌ͛s ϭϵϲϱ White Papeƌ100 proposed 
further restrictions on entry of Commonwealth citizens, plus conditions limiting lengths of stay and 
easier deportation procedures, while proposing separate legislation to outlaw race discrimination. 
There was no wide public debate on these measures, and, despite the significant restrictions and 
loss of rights proposed, the parliamentary debates on this are notable for speeches on both sides 
congratulating themselves aŶd eaĐh otheƌ foƌ takiŶg ƌaĐe aŶd iŵŵigƌatioŶ ͚out of politiĐs͛.  
On behalf of the extraparliamentary Left, David Widgery apologises that his book ͚ƌefleĐts the pƌe-
ϭϵϲϴ Left͛s Đoŵplete laĐk of iŶteƌest iŶ the paƌtiĐulaƌ situatioŶs of ǁoŵaŶ aŶd iŵŵigƌaŶts͛. 
Comparing the 1964 and 1966 election campaigns, the academic journal Race101 wrote:  
͚The issue of Đolouƌed iŵŵigƌatioŶ ĐaŶŶot ďe shoǁŶ to haǀe had aŶǇ sigŶifiĐaŶt iŵpaĐt at 
the 1966 geŶeƌal eleĐtioŶ…the Bƌadfoƌd Laďouƌ PaƌtǇ tǁo geŶeƌatioŶs ago Đould haǀe ďeeŶ 
relied on for some spirited idealism typical of the ILP [Independent Labour Party]. Today the 
paƌtǇ is ŵoƌe likelǇ to adopt ŵoƌe solid ͚pƌaĐtiĐal͛ poliĐies͛. Afteƌ the puďliĐation of the 
(Labour) 1965 White Paper they decided not to make any public statement. [The most 
important thing for the Party was that] they͛ve stopped talkiŶg aďout it iŶ the Đluďs͛… The 
[Laďouƌ] paƌtǇ͛s Ƌuite eǆpliĐit ƌetƌeat fƌoŵ its iŶteƌŶatioŶalist Ŷeo-principles on immigration 
poliĐǇ ǁeŶt uŶŵaƌked͛.102  
The White Paper policies were effectively enacted by the later Conservative government in the 
Immigration Act 1971.  In 1966 Cedric Thornberry, member of the Society of Labour Lawyers, had 
objected103 that Laďouƌ͛s ϭϵϲϱ White Papeƌ ŵeasuƌes had ƌeŵoǀed CoŵŵoŶǁealth ĐitizeŶs͛ 
essential legal rights and reduced them to the status of (undesirable) aliens. But his own pamphlet 
The stranger at the gate104 had proposed a similar structure of immigration control, with no critique 
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of any reasons put forward for imposing control, nor any economic or political analysis of the 
underlying motivations for migration, or of the causes of racism and discrimination in the host 
ĐouŶtƌǇ. It ĐoŶĐludes: ͚Noone suggests that the pattern of wholly unrestricted entry and unqualified 
asylum of ďefoƌe ϭϵϬϱ should ďe ƌesuƌƌeĐted͛.105 
The IŵŵigƌatioŶ AĐt ϭϵϳϭ put aŶ eŶd to ͚pƌiŵaƌǇ iŵŵigƌatioŶ͛ ;theŶ uŶdeƌstood as eŶtƌǇ of ŵale 
heads of households intending to work and bring their families). Entry was permitted only in 
accordance with the new Immigration Rules, under determinate categories (visitors, students, 
workers and family members).106 FolloǁiŶg the passiŶg of that AĐt ͚iŵŵigƌatioŶ͛ faded fƌoŵ the 
political agenda. The failure to confront the lack of housing, school places, jobs and health provision 
in those areas where growing numbers of immigrants had concentrated had exacerbated already 
serious local issues, allowing prejudice to turn into actual opposition to immigration. Instead of 
introducing programmes to remedy those shortages, Labour-run local authorities became the 
spearheads of race equality campaigns, leading to a particular political conception of 
ŵultiĐultuƌalisŵ ǁhiĐh has led to the ͚ideŶtitǇ politiĐs͛ of todaǇ. 107  
 
B. 1979-2010 – ͚ďogus asyluŵ-seekers͛, ͚foreigŶ ĐriŵiŶals͛ – and unrestricted immigration? 
IŵŵigƌatioŶ as a ͚Đƌisis͛ politiĐal issue ƌeeŵeƌged iŶ the ϴϬ͛s, iŶ the faĐe of aŶ eǆpoŶeŶtial iŶĐƌease 
iŶ asǇluŵ Đlaiŵs fƌoŵ iŶsigŶifiĐaŶt Ŷuŵďeƌs iŶ the ϴϬ͛s to oǀeƌ ϵϳ,ϬϬϬ Đlaiŵs108 in 2001. Government 
discourse, both Tory and then Labour, paid lip-seƌǀiĐe to ͚geŶuiŶe asǇluŵ-seekeƌs͛ ďut ĐoŶĐeŶtƌated 
entirely on how to restrict arrivals and how to restrict their rights once here. These changes aimed at 
asylum-seekers in fact arose from more general economic and political developments. Following the 
ƌeĐessioŶ of the ϳϬ͛s the CoŶseƌǀatiǀes led ďǇ Maƌgaƌet ThatĐheƌ ǁoŶ the ϭϵϳϵ geŶeƌal eleĐtioŶ, 
with a clear neoliberal programme of privatisation, deregulation, sales of social housing and 
reduction of spending on the ǁelfaƌe state. The Ŷeǁ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ŵoǀed ƋuiĐklǇ to Đuƌtail ŵigƌaŶts͛ 
aĐĐess to ǁelfaƌe ďeŶefits aŶd soĐial housiŶg. This poliĐǇ, iŶ ǁhiĐh ͚asǇluŵ-seekeƌs͛ ǁeƌe the 
ostensible target, was understood as a trial for reducing welfare entitlements across the board. 
Those policies were frankly heralded by anti-immigrant views supported by right-wing newspapers 
such as the Daily Express, Daily Mail and more soberly the Daily Telegraph.  
The ϵϬ͛s saǁ ŵajoƌ iŵŵigƌatioŶ legislatioŶ, iŶ ϭϵϵϲ109 excluding most migrants and all asylum-
seekers from receiving mainstream social assistance benefits and public housing, and in 1999110 
setting up an entirely separate welfare and housing system for asylum claimants, in a policy later 
desĐƌiďed as ͚destitutioŶ ďǇ desigŶ.111 Legislation in 2002112 enforced a distinction in welfare terms 
between those who claimed asylum on arrival and those who claimed after passing immigration 
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control.113 In 2004,114 as well as introducing new immigration offences and determining how asylum-
seekeƌs͛ ĐƌediďilitǇ should ďe ƌegaƌded,  the appellate sǇsteŵ ǁas ƌeoƌgaŶised agaiŶ, ŵakiŶg ϯ tiŵes 
in 10 years, each time in the hope of reducing the numbers of asylum appeals.  
IŶ ϮϬϬϲ aŶotheƌ iŵŵigƌatioŶ taƌget eŵeƌged, the ͚foƌeigŶ ŶatioŶal pƌisoŶeƌ͛ Ŷoǁ teƌŵed ͚foƌeigŶ 
ĐƌiŵiŶal͛. It eŵeƌged that oǀeƌ ϭϬϬϬ foƌeigŶ pƌisoŶeƌs had ďeeŶ ƌeleased at the eŶd of theiƌ ĐƌiŵiŶal 
sentences without being considered for deportation. The public outcry forced the resignation of a 
Home Secretary and the passiŶg of a Ŷeǁ iŵŵigƌatioŶ laǁ pƌoǀidiŶg foƌ ͚autoŵatiĐ depoƌtatioŶ͛, 
eǆĐept iŶ Đases ǁheƌe a peƌsoŶ͛s asǇluŵ oƌ huŵaŶ ƌights ŵight ďe ďƌeaĐhed.115 This ͚foƌeigŶ ŶatioŶal 
pƌisoŶeƌs͛ sĐaŶdal ǁas the ďegiŶŶiŶg of a ƌeleŶtless ĐaŵpaigŶ atteŵptiŶg to disĐƌedit ͚huŵaŶ ƌights͛ 
altogether, and which drove the negative development of human rights- based litigation in 
immigration generally.116  
Despite these fƌoŶtal attaĐks oŶ ŵigƌaŶts͛ aŶd asǇluŵ-seekeƌs͛ ƌights fƌoŵ ďoth CoŶseƌǀatiǀe aŶd 
Labour governments, there was almost no coherent political opposition. Lawyers used state legal aid 
to take up legal problems in a strategic way in ordeƌ to aĐhieǀe oƌ defeŶd people͛s ƌights to housiŶg, 
benefits, jobs, and, gradually, immigration rights. The introduction of the Human Rights Act in 1998 
had intensified these trends. In the realm of immigration and race we saw a move away from the 
more political anti-deportation and anti-ƌaĐist ĐaŵpaigŶs of the ϴϬ͛s117 which had attempted to 
make links between lack of opposition to racial discrimination in society and the essentially racial 
basis of immigration control, and wider economic issues. Instead, campaigns supporting individuals 
agaiŶst depoƌtatioŶ ďeĐaŵe ŵoƌe foĐused oŶ the iŶdiǀidual͛s liŶks ǁith the ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ aŶd aŶǇ 
special needs, rather than on rights and entitlements or economic solidarity. And the major 
opposition to curtailment of asylum-seekeƌs͛ ƌights ǁas ďased oŶ laƌge-scale legal actions.118 These 
moves towards legal rather than political actions have been paralleled by the advent of identity 
politics and celebration of difference, which has meant that political discussion now has to 
oǀeƌĐoŵe ďaƌƌieƌs of aĐute distƌust aŶd ƌeal feaƌ of ͚ĐausiŶg offeŶĐe͛, aŶd it seeŵs easieƌ to ŵouŶt 
suppoƌt foƌ a ǁoƌthǇ iŶdiǀidual͛s legal ďattle. 
 
Extraordinarily, this process, so corrosive of progressive and universalist politics, has taken place 
while successive Conservative, Labour, Coalition and Conservative governments nationally were 
instituting anti-immigrant policies aimed at those already in the UK, many with legitimate 
expectations of being able to remain permanently. For example, Labour moved from its 1998 White 
Paper119 which had broadly supported integration to the virtually opposite policies of lengthy 
probationary peƌiods foƌ settleŵeŶt aŶd a pƌoposal foƌ ͚eaƌŶed ĐitizeŶship͛ as ǁell as the ͚autoŵatiĐ 
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depoƌtatioŶ͛ of foƌeigŶ ĐƌiŵiŶals Ŷoted aďoǀe. The CoalitioŶ aŶd lateƌ CoŶseƌǀatiǀe goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
aiŵ to ͚ƌeduĐe Ŷet ŵigƌatioŶ to the teŶs of thousaŶds͛ has led to the introduction of significant 
restrictive requirements in every immigration category, curtailments of rights of appeal and the 
iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of ͚hostile eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt͛ poliĐies, desigŶed to ƌoot out ͚illegal ŵigƌaŶts͛ ďut iŶ faĐt 
affecting large cohorts of legal migrants with expectations of settlement.120 It is worth noting that in 
the offiĐial iŵŵigƌatioŶ statistiĐs, the appliĐatioŶs of those oŶ ͚ƌoutes to settleŵeŶt͛ aƌe Ŷoǁ 
desĐƌiďed as ͚eǆteŶsioŶs of teŵpoƌaƌǇ staǇ͛.121 Until very recently, this has taken place virtually 
without political  debate, on the assumption that public opinion is firmly anti-immigrant. 122  Only the 
ƌeĐeŶt ͚WiŶdƌush͛ deďaĐle has shoǁŶ politiĐiaŶs that puďliĐ opiŶioŶ ŵaǇ haǀe shifted. 
 
A common populist complaint is that the Labour government 1997-2010, contrary to popular 
understanding, had encouraged unrestricted immigration.123 Certainly, under Labour, work-based 
immigration was permitted to expand and foreign students were encouraged, especially after the 
introduction of the points-based system in 2007. And no limits were imposed on free movement of 
nationals of the 8 new EU accession countries in 2004, and many more arrived than had been 
anticipated. On the other hand, lookiŶg at Hoŵe “eĐƌetaƌǇ Daǀid BluŶkett͛s ϮϬϬϮ White Papeƌ 
Secure Borders, Safe Haven,124 the headline narrative, policies and laws introduced by the Labour 
government, as with the Conservative government before it, were directed at the protection of UK 
soĐietǇ aŶd the UK ǁelfaƌe sǇsteŵ fƌoŵ ͚ďogus͛ asǇluŵ-seekeƌs, ͚illegal͛ ŵigƌaŶts aŶd ͚foƌeigŶ 
ĐƌiŵiŶals͛, aŶd eŵphasised the Ŷeed foƌ eǆistiŶg ŵigƌaŶts to shoǁ ͚loǇaltǇ͛ aŶd ͚eaƌŶ͛ theiƌ ƌight to 
stay. However, the numbers of EU nationals who arrived after 2004, their high concentrations in 
some areas, and paradoxically their ability to find work and accommodation and settle down here, 
gave rise to resentment, leading to the rise in support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
especially in the so-Đalled ͚left ďehiŶd͛ Đoastal toǁŶs aŶd aƌeas ǁhose old iŶdustƌies had Đlosed 
down. The arrival of so many EU nationals under free movement provisions provided a clear basis 
for the ensuing campaign based on a demaŶd to ͚take ďaĐk ĐoŶtƌol͛ aŶd the ƌefeƌeŶduŵ ǀiĐtoƌǇ oŶ 
leaving the EU. 
A recent report from the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights in the UK125 
provides a wider context into which to place the situation of migrants and asylum-seekers. The 
author Professor Alston does not mince his words. In his introduction he describes what he saw:  
͚… the iŵŵeŶse gƌoǁth iŶ foodďaŶks aŶd the queues waiting outside them, the people 
sleepiŶg ƌough oŶ the stƌeets, the seŶse of despaiƌ… AŶd loĐal authoƌities, ǁhiĐh pƌoǀide ǀital 
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roles in providing a real social safety net have been gutted by a series of government 
poliĐies…While the laďouƌ aŶd housing markets provide the crucial backdrop, the focus of 
this report is on the contribution made by social security and related policies. 
The results? 14 million people, a fifth of the population, lives in poverty. Four million of these 
are more than 50% below the poverty line, and 1.5 million are destitute, unable to afford 
ďasiĐ ŶeĐessities… Foƌ alŵost oŶe iŶ eǀeƌǇ tǁo ĐhildƌeŶ to ďe pooƌ iŶ tǁeŶtǇ-first century 
Britain is not just a disgrace, but a social calamity and an economic disaster, all rolled into 
one.  
He is Đleaƌ iŶ ideŶtifǇiŶg the Đauses of this aŶd appoƌtioŶiŶg ďlaŵe, poiŶtiŶg to the ͚austeƌitǇ͛ polities 
of the Coalition and Conservative governments coupled with the introduction of Universal Credit at 
such payment levels and such methods of delivery as inevitably to increase poverty and hardship. He 
concludes:  
The experience of the United Kingdom, especially since 2010, underscores the conclusion that 
poverty is a political choice. 
 
Foƌ ͚destiŶatioŶ͛ ĐouŶtƌies, the Gloďal CoŵpaĐt pƌoposes, aŵong other recommendations, 
facilitating family reunion for temporary migrants, the reduction of precariousness, and 
encouragement of integration. It can be seen from the above that under the present UK government 
there is no appetite for any of this. Since 2010 the rights of foreign workers and students to bring in 
faŵilǇ ŵeŵďeƌs haǀe ďeeŶ sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ Đuƌtailed. The UK͛s faŵilǇ ƌeuŶioŶ ƌights foƌ ƌefugees aƌe the 
narrowest in Europe. Far from reducing precariousness, several measures have been deliberately 
introduced to increase it.126 First, several categories of worker and student are no longer eligible to 
apply for indefinite leave to remain. Secondly, those on the so-Đalled ͚ƌoutes to settleŵeŶt͛ haǀe 
fouŶd those ͚ƌoutes͛ stƌetĐhiŶg out iŶto the futuƌe, the ǁaǇ to settleŵeŶt ďaƌƌed ďǇ eǆtƌeŵelǇ high 
application fees and the Immigration Health Surcharge. Finally, the Immigration Act 2014 introduced 
͚puďliĐ iŶteƌest͛ Đƌiteƌia to ďe takeŶ iŶto aĐĐouŶt ǁheŶ ĐoŶsideƌiŶg appliĐaŶts͛ ƌights to faŵilǇ aŶd 
private life under art 8 ECHR,127 iŶ ǁhiĐh, iŶ sϭϭϳB, ͚little ǁeight͛ is to ďe giǀeŶ to aŶ appliĐaŶt͛s 
pƌiǀate life aĐƋuiƌed duƌiŶg a peƌiod ǁheŶ his staǇ iŶ the UK ǁas ͚pƌeĐaƌious͛. EǆpliĐitlǇ foƌ ƌeasoŶs of 
straightforward decision-making, the Supreme Court has recently determined128 that a peƌsoŶ͛s staǇ 
is precarious unless he has either indefinite leave or citizenship. This, at a stroke, renders precarious 
almost all migrants, iŶĐludiŶg studeŶts, ǁoƌkeƌs, faŵilǇ ŵeŵďeƌs oŶ ͚ƌoutes to settleŵeŶt͛, aŶǇoŶe 
given discretionary leave outside the immigration rules, refugees and those with humanitarian 
protection, and EU migrants who have not yet acquired permanent residence. This is inimical to 
integration. What is problematic for the aims of the Global Compact is that the impact of this, along 
ǁith the otheƌ ͚hostile eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt͛ ŵeasuƌes, is Ŷot ǁidelǇ uŶdeƌstood. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ the fuŶdaŵeŶtal issue foƌ the Gloďal CoŵpaĐt is that ͚iŵŵigƌatioŶ͛, aloŶg ǁith ƌaĐe, has 
ďeeŶ eǆpliĐitlǇ aŶd fƌaŶklǇ pƌoďleŵatised iŶ Bƌitish politiĐs foƌ deĐades, aŶd ǁhile the left͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ, 
generally speaking, has been diverted into the realm of multiculturalism and identity politics, the 
field of debate about immigration has been left to the Conservatives and populists. This is explicitly 
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not to conclude that those populist concerns are without foundatioŶ, oƌ that the deŵaŶd to ͚take 
ďaĐk ĐoŶtƌol͛ is igŶoďle. It is to eŶĐouƌage, aŶd iŶdeed deŵaŶd, a ǁideƌ paƌtiĐipatioŶ iŶ that deďate 
which would explicitly draw on what we have in common as UK residents rather than celebrating our 
differences. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper I have attempted to show that the laudable aims of the Global Compact, as presented, 
provide no room for consideration of the complex historical economic and political realities affecting 
͚seŶdiŶg͛, ͚tƌaŶsit͛ aŶd ͚destiŶatioŶ͛ ĐouŶtries. My concern is that without such consideration, the 
CoŵpaĐt͛s ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs ǁill Ŷot just appeaƌ as siŵple good iŶteŶtioŶs, ďut as uŶǁaƌƌaŶted aŶd 
resented interference from supra-ŶatioŶal oƌgaŶisatioŶs, seekiŶg to pƌioƌitise the Ŷeeds of ͚ŵigƌaŶts͛ 
qua migrants ƌatheƌ thaŶ deŵaŶdiŶg a deŵoĐƌatiĐ deďate aďout the ďasis of ͚ďeloŶgiŶg͛, aŶd ǁhat 
should be the rights and entitlements of residents, in a given polity.   
IŶ ƌelatioŶ to Eƌitƌea, ŵǇ eǆaŵple of a ͚seŶdiŶg͛ ĐouŶtƌǇ, it is Đleaƌ that its goǀeƌnment retains and in 
fact derives political strength from its coherent history, supported by evidence, of nothing but harm 
from the outside, leaving it to turn back on itself and survive the best way it can. Blaming and 
sanctioning Eritrea for its manifest human rights abuses, etc, without more, is unlikely to achieve 
change. There is even a possibility that European overtures to Eritrea, if limited to the aim of 
reducing asylum-seekers entering Europe, will exacerbate its human rights abuses and delay any 
progress to democracy.129 Currently it may be hoped that the opening from a changed Ethiopia may 
offer a route towards introducing democratic rights for its people, surely the only secure basis for 
the economic and social policies proposed by the Compact for reducing emigration and flight. 
In relation to Italy and the UK, it is interesting to draw out the similarities as well as the contrasts, in 
relation to the expectations of the Global Compact. Both are countries in which global capitalist 
pƌoĐesses haǀe ƌesulted iŶ ͚left ďehiŶd͛ ĐoŵŵuŶities ǁhiĐh haǀe ďeeŶ diffeƌeŶtiallǇ affeĐted ďǇ 
neoliberal economic and social policies at the national level and who are experiencing significant 
poverty and deprivation. Both countries have seen populist responses, in Italy directed much more 
strongly against new and recently-arrived immigrants, with government policies more frankly racist, 
while in the UK the recent opposition has been to the big influx of EU nationals, while racism 
remains below the surface and formally prohibited. In both countries, recent populist demands to 
͚take ďaĐk ĐoŶtƌol͛, ǁhetheƌ speĐifiĐallǇ fƌoŵ the EU oƌ ŵoƌe geŶeƌallǇ fƌoŵ tƌaditioŶal politiĐal 
parties or technocratic elites, must be seen as a more fundamental dissatisfaction and 
disillusioŶŵeŶt ǁith ͚politiĐs͛. But ǁhile foƌ ŵaŶǇ the ǁoƌk leadiŶg to the adoptioŶ of the Gloďal 
Compact is seen as a fruitful, humane way to resolve major world problems, almost without having 
to ƌesoƌt to ͚politiĐs͛, the ǀeƌǇ aƌƌiǀal fƌoŵ ͚outside͛ of suĐh pƌoposals is likelǇ to provoke hostility 
from first-world populations such as those in Italy and the UK, who possess democratic rights but 
with few willing to listen to their grievances. 
Sheona York  
17/3/19 
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